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A plethora of studies has demonstrated that low-power negotiators attain lower
outcomes compared to high-power negotiators. We argue that this low-power
disadvantage can be conceptualized as impaired goal attainment and that
self-regulation can help to overcome it. Three experiments tested this assertion. In
Study 1, low-power negotiators attained lower profits compared to their high-power
opponents in a face-to-face negotiation. Negotiators who set themselves goals and
those who additionally formed if-then plans prior to the negotiation overcame the
low-power disadvantage. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these effects in computer-mediated
negotiations: Low-power negotiators conceded more than high-power negotiators.
Again, setting goals and forming additional if-then plans helped to counter the power
disadvantage. Process analyses revealed that negotiators’ concession-making at the
start of the negotiation mediated both the low-power disadvantage and the beneficial
effects of self-regulation. The present findings show how the low-power disadvantage
unfolds in negotiations and how self-regulatory techniques can help to overcome it.
Keywords: negotiation, power, self-regulation, if-then plans, setting goals
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a job applicant who is about to negotiate her salary with a prospective employer. Her
obvious goal is to negotiate a good salary. She knows that there are dozens of other applicants the
employer could hire instead of her, leaving her in a low-power position. When the negotiations
begin, the employer opens with a low-ball offer that would pay the applicant much less than
necessary for a decent living. This highly prevalent real-life example illustrates a key question: How
can negotiators craft a profitable deal despite a low-power position? Abundant research suggests
that low power in negotiations results in unfavorable outcomes. Since crafting profitable deals is a
key goal for negotiators, in the present research, we propose that this low-power disadvantage can
be understood as impaired goal attainment. We argue that self-regulation techniques such as setting
goals and forming if-then plans, which are geared toward improving goal attainment, can help low-
power negotiators to improve their outcomes and, hence, overcome the perils of low power. From
a theoretical perspective, the present studies extend the literature by showing when and how the
low-power disadvantage unfolds and how self-regulatory techniques can help to overcome it.
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LOW POWER IN NEGOTIATIONS
Power is one of the most fundamental factors to shape
the course and outcome of negotiations (Fisher et al., 1991;
Thompson et al., 2010; Overbeck and Kim, 2013). From
union-management negotiations, to salary negotiations, to
parents discussing bedtime with their children, it is difficult
to imagine a negotiation in which power does not play a
vital role. Previous research defined low power as a structural
state of having a comparatively limited control over scarce
resources and therefore being dependent on another party
(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Magee
and Galinsky, 2008). Our common sense tells us that high-
power parties will prevail in negotiations with low-power parties.
A host of experimental studies confirms this notion, showing
that low-power negotiators reach poorer negotiation outcomes:
They claim less value (De Dreu, 1995), are exposed to more
attempts of intimidation (De Dreu, 1995), are less willing to
initiate negotiations (Volkema et al., 2013), are less likely to
make first offers (which generally yields a bargaining advantage;
Magee et al., 2007), concede more (Van Kleef et al., 2006), and –
most importantly – end up with less profitable deals compared
to their more powerful opponents (Dwyer and Walker, 1981;
Pinkley et al., 1994; Brett et al., 1996; Giebels et al., 2000;
Kim and Fragale, 2005; Kim et al., 2005; Wolfe and McGinn,
2005).
Surprisingly, whereas abundant research has described
how low power impairs negotiation outcomes, little research
has addressed how parties can overcome this low-power
disadvantage. Doing so would not only benefit low-power
negotiators but could also shed light on the underlying
processes that cause the low-power disadvantage in the first
place. In other words, a means to overcome the low-power
disadvantage offers a theoretical contribution as it may
tackle a meaningful mediator that underlies the low-power
disadvantage. The present article aims to identify such a
mediator.
Following from the reality that crafting profitable deals
is one of the major goals in negotiations (Allred, 2000), it
is rather straightforward to conceptualize the low-power
disadvantage (impaired outcome either relative to an opponent
or to the optimal outcome) in negotiations as an instance
of impaired goal attainment. Hence, crafting a suboptimal
deal represents impaired goal attainment. Self-regulation
research offers a variety of tools that improve goal attainment,
a number of which seem feasible for negotiations (e.g.,
setting goals, if-then plans, mental contrasting; Friese et al.,
2011; Jäger et al., 2015). Applying self-regulation tools
might thus be a promising approach to overcome the
low-power disadvantage. Corroborating the notion that
improving self-regulation might help with the low-power
disadvantage, some prior evidence already suggests that
low-power negotiators set less ambitious goals than high-power
negotiators (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005), and fail to initiate
goal-congruent behavior (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007;
Steidle et al., 2013). Both of these behaviors reflect deficient
self-regulation.
SELF-REGULATION IN NEGOTIATIONS
Self-regulation research investigates how people pursue goals and
which factors promote or impede goal attainment (Mann et al.,
2013; Vohs and Baumeister, 2016). Self-regulation comprises
all efforts to alter one’s thoughts, emotions, and behavior in
order to improve goal attainment, including, for example, setting
goals, planning, implementing plans, and shielding plans from
competing processes (Mischel et al., 1996; Fujita, 2011).
One particularly effective self-regulation technique is to set
goals (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Locke and Latham, 2015). Goals
are the deliberate formulation of what an individual wants
to attain (Locke et al., 1981), guiding all subsequent efforts,
encouraging persistence, facilitating strategy development, and
mobilizing on-task effort (Locke et al., 1981). A meta-analysis
has shown that – independent of power differences between
negotiators – setting goals is overall a successful strategy to
improve negotiation outcomes (Zetik and Stuhlmacher, 2002).
Together with the finding that low power leads people to
form relatively unambitious goals (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005)
this leads to the prediction that setting goals should help
low-power parties to overcome the low-power disadvantage and
attain more profitable outcomes. Low-power negotiators not
only set unambitious goals, but also have difficulties initiating
goal-congruent actions (i.e., goal pursuit; Steidle et al., 2013).
Those findings might be rooted in low-power individuals’
general difficulties to initiate actions (compared to high-power
individuals; Galinsky et al., 2003). Moreover, low power increases
situational pressure, leading low-power individuals to act in
accordance with situational cues (Galinsky et al., 2008). This
may prevent low-power negotiators from initiating goal-directed
actions. The self-regulation technique of forming if-then plans
(Gollwitzer, 1999) may be an effective means to address this
concern. If-then plans specify when and how to carry out
goal-directed behavior, according to the pattern, “If situation
X arises, then I will do Y” (Gollwitzer, 1999). In doing so, if
then-plans extend pre-set goals (“My goal is to obtain Z”) and
considerably improve goal attainment beyond setting goals alone
(see Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006, for a meta-analysis). They help
initiating goal-directed actions even against strong situational
pressure and habits (Armitage, 2004, 2007; Holland et al., 2006).
If-then plans work by creating a mental link between the
critical situation (the if -part) and the desirable behavior (the
then-part; Webb and Sheeran, 2006, 2008; Achtziger et al.,
2012). They increase the perceptual readiness to recognize
critical situations and to carry out the a-priori defined behavior
effortlessly (Webb and Sheeran, 2006, 2008; Achtziger et al.,
2012). If-then plans are capable of implementing complex mental
processes (Henderson et al., 2007; Wieber et al., 2015). A key
advantage of this technique is that the If-X-then-Y structure is
very flexible and can be easily adapted to a variety of settings,
rendering these plans a feasible tool in the dynamic context of
negotiations (Trötschel and Gollwitzer, 2007; Kirk et al., 2011;
Wieber et al., 2014).
The above considerations lead to the question which goal-
directed behavior low-power negotiators should implement to
overcome their disadvantage. As mentioned above, low power
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leads to poor outcomes (e.g., a seller agrees to a low selling
price). Based on research that identifies the back and forth of
offers and counteroffers as the most basic building block of
negotiations (e.g., Pruitt and Syna, 1985; Weingart et al., 1990;
Prietula and Weingart, 2011) and a host of studies that speak
to the importance of refraining from large early concessions
(e.g., Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Loschelder et al., 2014a,b,
2016), it can be said that a poor outcome implies at least
one of three shortcomings in dyadic negotiation behavior: (1)
parties fail to make self-serving offers, (2) parties fail to reject
unfavorable (counter) offers, or (3) parties make too large and
potentially premature concessions. All three shortcomings could
be addressed via setting goals (e.g., “I will negotiate tenaciously”)
and be further refined with additional if-then plans (e.g., “If my
opponent makes a bad offer, then I will reject it”). We will identify
in the subsequent studies which of these behaviors accounts for
the power disadvantage.
OVERVIEW
The present research examines whether and how the negotiation
disadvantage of low power can be overcome by self-regulation
techniques. In Study 1, low-power negotiators were equipped
with goals or additional plans to face a high-power opponent
in a face-to-face negotiation. In Studies 2 and 3, low-power
negotiators were equipped with goals or additional plans to face
a high-powered opponent in a computer-mediated negotiation.
Arguably, face-to-face negotiations constitute the default case
for real-world negotiations in many contexts and domains.
Computer-mediated negotiations became increasingly more
important in the last decade (e.g., ebay.com and alibaba.com had
a combined net revenue of over $20 billion in 2014)1. Both forms
of negotiations are by far more prevalent than any alternative
form of negotiation (e.g., written exchange in oﬄine contexts).
Face-to-face and computer-mediated negotiations differ
in a number of factors. Most importantly, computer-
mediated negotiations allow for only a reduced bandwidth
of communicational cues to be sent and received as compared
to face-to-face negotiations (Stuhlmacher and Citera, 2005). To
illustrate, whether negotiators face each other or communicate
via a computer has distinct impacts on negotiation behavior
(e.g., rapport building; Arunachalam and Dilla, 1995), parties’
interpersonal perceptions (e.g., judgment accuracy; Drolet and
Morris, 2000), and on negotiation outcomes (Croson, 1999;
Morris et al., 2002). Accordingly, conceptually replicating results
in both contexts should increase confidence in the proposed
effects and their ecological validity. In addition to generally
investigating the disadvantage of low power and the advantage
of self-regulation, we examine how the low-power disadvantage
emerges and, in a second step, how self-regulation techniques
help to overcome this low-power disadvantage. Specifically, we
contrast two mechanisms potentially mediating the effect of
power and self-regulation techniques in Studies 2 and 3. We
examined (a) if power affects negotiation outcomes, and (b) if
1www.statista.com (Statista.com, 2015a,b)
the two self-regulatory antidotes counter this effect throughout
the whole negotiation or mainly at the very beginning of
negotiations. Therefore, we contrasted parties’ first concessions
and concessions in the subsequent negotiation process.
STUDY 1: OVERCOMING LOW POWER
IN A FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION
Study 1 examined the hypothesis that low-power negotiators
will craft more profitable deals by setting goals and forming
if-then plans. In a control condition a high-power and a low-
power negotiator negotiated without either party receiving self-
regulatory help. In two further experimental conditions low-
power negotiators either specified a goal (goal condition) or
an additional if-then plan (plan condition). We predicted that
in the control condition high-power negotiators would achieve
more beneficial negotiation outcomes than their low-power
counterparts (Hypothesis 1). The outcome difference between
high- and low-power parties should be reduced in the goal
condition (Hypothesis 2a) and even further reduced in the
plan condition (Hypothesis 2b). Note that not fully crossing
power and self-regulation allows focusing on the main research
question – does self-regulation help to overcome the detriments
brought about by low power in negotiations? We wish to clarify
that this constrained design does not allow for an investigation
of the interaction of power and self-regulation. This latter
question is an interesting topic in its own regard, but it was not
crucial for present purposes. The same holds true for Studies 2
and 3.
Method
Ethics Statement for All Studies
At our institution, the studies reported here are considered
minimal risk studies that did not require formal ethical
approval. Researchers are given responsibility to conduct their
research in line with ethical guidelines provided by the national
psychological association that all researches are required to
follow. Participants were not fully informed about the goals
of the respective study beforehand, because this would have
undermined the effects of the experimental manipulations. All
participants were thoroughly debriefed after taking part in a
study.
Participants and Design
One hundred and thirty-eight participants were recruited on the
campus of Saarland University in exchange for €5. Additionally,
participants took part in a lottery of a €25 gift certificate for a
popular internet store that was raﬄed among the five participants
with the highest individual gains at the end of the negotiation.
Participants were randomly assigned to the (1) control, (2)
goal, or (3) plan condition. Three dyads (six participants) were
excluded from the analyses because one of the participants did
not make a plan or did not set a goal (n = 2) or because one
of the participants reported having detailed a priori knowledge
about the study (n = 1). This left a final sample of 66 dyads
(132 participants, Mage = 23.79, SD= 3.82).
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Procedure
In each session, two participants engaged in a sales negotiation.
Negotiators were seated opposite to each other at a rectangular
bargaining table. Buyer and seller roles were assigned randomly
to their respective role. After welcoming participants, the
experimenter gave a summary of the negotiation task and
reminded participants that negotiating successfully would
increase their chances of winning the €25 gift certificate.
Participants had 9 min to read their instructions and to
familiarize themselves with their payoff table (Table 1).
Participants then negotiated for up to 9 min. Pretests had shown
this period of time to be sufficient for finding an agreement
on all items. At the end of the negotiation, participants noted
their agreement or an impasse on a contract sheet, filled out a
post-experimental questionnaire, were debriefed, thanked, and
paid.
Negotiation Task
Each dyad negotiated the sale of ten robots in an industrial
context (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975).
Buyers were placed in a high-power position, whereas sellers
were placed in a low-power position (see below). Both parties
learned that they should negotiate the best possible deal for
their company (scoring as many points as possible). The
negotiation revolved around four issues (i.e., price, warranty
period, maintenance contract, delivery time; see Table 1). Each
issue had 13 potential levels of agreement, with points reflecting
the value of each agreement level. The maximum of points per
participant was+86; the minimum was−86 (Table 1).
Participants were told that they had to come to an agreement
on all four issues. In case of a non-agreement on at least one
issue the negotiation would be considered an impasse and both
parties would receive the points described as their alternative to
negotiating an agreement (see below).
Experimental Manipulations
To realize a particularly strong power manipulation – which
self-regulation techniques were tested to overcome – we
combined three established power manipulations. First,
high-power negotiators (buyers) were asked to write about a
situation in their lives in which they had power over another
person (Galinsky et al., 2003). The low-power negotiators
did not write about such an incident but were given time
to take notes to prepare for the negotiation. Second, the
buyer role was described as more powerful than the seller
role (Pinkley et al., 1994): Buyers read that they were in a
superior position (i.e., buyers’ market; see Trötschel et al.,
2015). Sellers read that they were in an inferior position.
Third, negotiators’ alternatives to crafting an agreement
were manipulated in that high-power buyers had a good
alternative: They could buy the product from another company
(equivalent to +10 points as final outcome; Pinkley et al.,
1994). By contrast, sellers had no alternative to a negotiated
agreement (no alternative buyers, equivalent to 0 points as final
outcome).
To manipulate self-regulation, low-power negotiators in
the goal condition read that past research has shown people TA
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to benefit from setting goals. Parties were asked to set
themselves the following goal: “I will achieve as many points as
possible.” In the plan condition, low-power parties additionally
read that a specific plan on how to implement goals was
beneficial. They were asked to form the following plan: “If
my opponent makes an unfavorable offer, then I will reject
it and make a mutually beneficial counteroffer.” Low-power
negotiators in the control condition received no self-regulatory
help.
Dependent Variables
To quantify the extent of the low-power disadvantage, the
difference in points for low-power and high-power parties
served as the main dependent variable. Negative scores
indicate that high-power parties claimed more points than
low-power opponents; positive scores indicate that the
low-power negotiator earned more points than the high-power
opponent.
After the negotiation ended, participants rated their feelings
of power during the negotiation with four items in a
post-negotiation questionnaire (e.g., “I felt powerful in the course
of the negotiation,” “Compared to my opponent I felt superior,”
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree,
α = 0.79) as a manipulation check. Finally, demographic data
were obtained (e.g., age, sex, field of study).
Results
Throughout this manuscript, outliers more than 2.5 SDs from the
respective condition mean of the main dependent variable were
excluded.
Manipulation Check
A paired t-test between the high-power (M = 4.92, SD = 0.87)
and the low-power negotiator (M = 3.86, SD = 0.91) within
a dyad yielded a significant difference in self-reported power
in the control condition (t[20] = 3.65, p = 0.002, d = 1.64).
This power difference was not found for the two self-regulation
conditions (both ts< 1.24, both ps> 0.230). The overall ANOVA
showed a significant Power × Self-regulation interaction only,
F(2,60) = 4.54, p = 0.015, η2p = 0.13 [power main effect:
F(1,60) = 1.07, p = 0.304, η2p = 0.02]. These findings indicate
that, first, the power manipulation was effective in the control
condition. Second, participants in the goal and plan conditions,
in retrospect, did not feel less powerful than their opponents –
possibly because the success of the self-regulation techniques led
these participants to feel equally powerful as their more powerful
opponents. We will return to this finding in the discussion of
Study 1.
Negotiation Outcomes
As expected, high-power negotiators claimed more value than
their low-power opponents in the control condition, as indicated
by a difference score significantly lower than zero (M1 = –8.24,
SD = 6.80), t(20) = −5.55, p < 0.001, d = −1.21. There was
no such effect in the goal condition (M1 = 1.15, SD = 10.63),
t(19) = 0.48, p = 0.634, d = 0.11 and the plan condition
(M1 = 4.36, SD = 17.60), t(21) = 1.16, p = 0.258, d = 0.25. The
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the experimental
condition, F(2,60)= 5.71, p= 0.005, η2p = 0.16. Further analyses
showed that low-power parties in both the goal (t[32.05] = 3.35,
p = 0.002, d = 1.18) and the plan (t[27.37] = 3.12, p = 0.004,
d = 1.19) condition outperformed their low-power equivalents
in the control condition. In line with Hypotheses 2a and 2b, low-
power negotiators reached increasingly beneficial outcomes from
the control condition, to the goal condition, to the plan condition.
The linear trend was highly significant, F(1,60)= 10.69, p= 0.002
(Figure 1). Despite this linear trend, the plan condition was only
descriptively, but not significantly, more successful than the goal
condition, t(35.01)= 0.72, p= 0.474, d = 0.24.
Discussion
In line with prior research, low-power negotiators achieved lower
profits than their high-power opponents (Pinkley et al., 1994).
Setting a goal or setting a goal and additionally forming a
plan on how to implement goal-consistent action eliminated
the power disadvantage (Figure 1). These findings support the
assumption that the self-regulation techniques of setting goals
and forming if-then plans can help to overcome the low-power
disadvantage.
The manipulation check revealed that low-power negotiators
in the two self-regulation conditions did not report significantly
lower feelings of power than their more powerful opponents.
This surprising finding may have resulted from the fact
that the manipulation check was assessed after a deal had
been made, possibly causing beneficial deals to mitigate the
subjective power disadvantage. In line with this assumption,
regression analyses showed that outcome differences between
high-power and low-power negotiators were a significant positive
predictor for self-reported feelings of power reported after the
negotiation (β = 0.02, t[61] = 2.02, p = 0.048). The more
beneficial the outcome for the low-power negotiator, the more
powerful they felt. Together with the substantial differences
in reported power in the control condition this suggests that
the power manipulation may initially have been effective in all
conditions, but that low-power negotiators in the self-regulation
conditions learned during the course of the negotiation that
things were going well for them (i.e., that they were not
powerless after all), which in turn increased subjective feelings of
power.
FIGURE 1 | Mean point difference between the low-power and the
high-power negotiator as a function of self-regulatory condition in
Study 1. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
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STUDY 2: OVERCOMING LOW POWER
IN COMPUTER-MEDIATED
NEGOTIATIONS
The purpose of Study 2 was threefold. First, we sought to
generalize the effects obtained in Study 1 to the context
of computer-mediated negotiations. Many negotiations occur
online – via e-mail and instant messaging (Katsh and Rifkin,
2001; Dorado et al., 2002; Tyler, 2004), or over trading
and auction websites (e.g., ebay, craigslist, or alibaba). We
relied on one of the most widely used computer-mediated
negotiation paradigms (De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995; Sinaceur
and Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef and Côté, 2007; Steinel et al.,
2008; Van Kleef and De Dreu, 2010). Previous research
has shown that in this paradigm low power constitutes a
negotiation disadvantage that leads parties to make lower
final offers (larger concessions; Van Kleef et al., 2006). We
expected that low-power negotiators would make lower final
offers than high-power negotiators (Hypothesis 1) and that
this low-power disadvantage would be reduced in the low
power+goal (Hypothesis 2a) and in the low power+plan
condition (Hypothesis 2b).
Second, Study 2’s design addresses a possible confound in
Study 1. In Study 2, we assigned both high- and low-power
negotiators to the same role (instead of buyer versus seller as in
Study 1) to rule out that the effects from Study 1 were actually
role effects rather than power effects.
Third, we sought to cast light on how and – more
importantly – when power unfolds its effect in the negotiation
process. This key question has been largely neglected up to
this point. At least two different mechanisms are conceivable.
On one hand, power may affect the very beginning of a
negotiation in that low-power negotiators may make particularly
large concessions early on during the negotiations – a
disadvantage that may be difficult to overcome during the
remaining negotiation. On the other hand, the difference
between high power and low power could take time to
unfold. Many negotiation experts advise to first build rapport
at the beginning of a negotiation (Moore et al., 1999;
Nadler, 2004; Fisher and Shapiro, 2005). Following such
advice might lead negotiators, even powerful ones, to start
moderately. Hence, high versus low-power negotiators might
not differ in their initial concessions but rather in their
concession-making during the negotiation process. Identifying
the leverage point of power differences is not only of theoretical
importance but could also prove helpful with respect to assisting
low-power negotiators to overcome their disadvantage. Hence,
we also explored the extent to which self-regulation affected
parties’ initial and subsequent concession-making during the
negotiation.
Method
Participants and Design
Ninety-five participants of {Saarland University} (Mage = 23.45,
SD = 5.99) were randomly assigned to a (1) high power, (2) low
power, (3) low power+goal, or (4) low power+plan condition.
Procedure
In each session, up to four participants were seated in separate
cubicles equipped with desktop computers. First, posture was
manipulated (see below; Huang et al., 2011). All subsequent
instructions were presented on the computer screen. Participants
were informed that the study was conducted together with the
university’s management department and that the opponent was
located in the management building during the negotiation. In
reality, participants negotiated with a computer program that
standardized and simulated the counterpart’s behavior (Van Kleef
and Côté, 2007). Next, the self-regulation manipulations were
established (see below).
At the start of the negotiation, participants saw a “Waiting
for server” message while the program allegedly connected
participants from different departments. Negotiations ended after
six rounds of offers and counteroffers. After it had ended, it was
explained to the participants that the study’s goal was to examine
early phases of negotiations to ensure that participants were not
irritated due to the abrupt ending. Then, participants completed
a post-experimental questionnaire before being probed for
suspicion. They were thoroughly debriefed, paid, and thanked.
The experimenter apologized for the deception.
Negotiation Task
Participants assumed the role of a job candidate negotiating with
a prospective employer. The job negotiation featured three issues:
Salary, vacation days, and working hours (modeled after Van
Kleef et al., 2004; Sinaceur et al., 2011). Each of the three issues
had nine agreement levels yielding between one and nine points
(Table 2). The maximum of points to be earned was 27, the
minimum was 3. Participants were given a payoff chart and each
negotiation offer and counteroffer was converted into a point sum
on participants’ computer screen.
Participants were instructed to earn as many points as
possible and learned that their points would be converted
into lottery tickets—with their chances of winning a €25
gift certificate from a popular internet store being directly
proportionate to their negotiated points. Only dyads with
an agreement were to participate in the lottery. Thus, the
task resembled the mixed-motive nature of most real-life
TABLE 2 | Payoff table for participants (employees) in Studies 2 and 3.
Negotiation issues
Points Wage (€) Vacation days Working hours
Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller
1 2400 3200 25 33 43 35
2 2500 3100 26 32 42 36
3 2600 3000 27 31 41 37
4 2700 2900 28 30 40 38
5 2800 2800 29 29 39 39
6 2900 2700 30 28 38 40
7 3000 2600 31 26 37 41
8 3100 2500 32 27 36 42
9 3200 2400 33 25 35 43
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negotiations: Parties strove to maximize their outcomes while
also needing to cooperate to reach an agreement (Sinaceur et al.,
2011).
Negotiators proposed offers and counteroffers via a computer
interface by moving sliders for each negotiation issue. They
had the opportunity to communicate via short text messages.
The employer (the computer-simulated opponent) made the first
offer. Thereafter, job candidate and employer made alternating
offers and counteroffers. The negotiation ended (1) when an
offer from the participant equaled or exceeded the next pre-
programmed offer, (2) when the participant accepted an offer,
or (3) after a maximum of six rounds (De Dreu and Van Lange,
1995; Van Kleef and Côté, 2007). The simulated employer made
the following offers for salary, vacation days, and working hours,
respectively (in points for the participant): 2–3–2 (Round 1),
2–3–3 (Round 2), 2–4–3 (Round 3), 3–4–3 (Round 4), 3–4–4
(Round 5), and 4–4–4 (Round 6). Prior research suggests that
this offer pattern leads participants to believe they are negotiating
with a real counterpart. It is perceived as intermediate in
cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu and Van Lange,
1995).
Experimental Manipulations
We again used multiple, established power manipulations to
provide a conservative test for the effectiveness of self-regulation
techniques. First, a posture manipulation (Carney et al., 2010,
2015; Huang et al., 2011) was realized prior to the start of
the negotiation. The experimenter informed participants that
certain postures would help them concentrate and engage
in their role as job candidate. In the low-power conditions,
participants were asked to vividly imagine being a job candidate
without alternatives, while putting their hands under their thighs,
placing their legs closely together and looking at the space
between their feet for 90 s (Carney et al., 2010). In the high-
power condition, participants were asked to vividly imagine
being a job candidate with plenty of alternatives, while placing
their feet on the table (legs stretched), crossing their hands
behind their head, and looking upward for 90 s (Carney et al.,
2010).
Second, we realized a prominent role manipulation of power
(Pinkley et al., 1994). High-power negotiators were told that they
had numerous job offers, which they could fall back to if this
negotiation ended without an agreement. Low-power negotiators
were told that the market was very competitive and that they
had no alternatives to this particular job. To enhance this second
power manipulation, the alleged employer (i.e., the program) sent
text messages emphasizing her/his powerful position together
with the offers in round 3 and round 5 (De Dreu, 1995). The first
expression read: “You will have to make some concessions. There
are other well-qualified candidates.” The second expression read:
“You should seriously consider whether you want this job or not.
I don’t see us reaching an agreement this way.” Participants in the
high-power condition did not receive these messages. To increase
experimental realism, the computer program sent the following
messages in all four conditions after rounds 1 and 2, respectively:
“Here is my first offer” and “Hmm. I will offer this:” No messages
were sent after rounds 4 and 6.
To manipulate self-regulation, participants in the low
power+goal condition read prior to the negotiation that past
research has shown people to benefit from being tenacious in
negotiations. They were asked to set themselves the following
goal: “I will negotiate tenaciously and claim as many points
as possible.” Participants in the low power+plan condition
additionally read that a specific plan on how to implement their
goal was beneficial. They were asked to form the following plan:
“If my opponent makes a request or tries to put me under
pressure, then I will not be swayed and budge from my offer in
small steps only.”
Dependent Variables
Participants’ final offers served as the dependent variable:
We examined how much less participants claimed than the
theoretical maximum of 27 points.
Follow-up analyses also investigated potential underlying
mechanisms of power and self-regulation techniques on final
outcomes. As detailed above, the low-power disadvantage could
be a consequence of different types of concession-making:
Initial concessions or concessions made during the subsequent
negotiation process. To disentangle these possibilities, we
examined initial concessions (counteroffer in round 1) and
subsequent concessions (offer in round 5 minus offer in round
2, controlling for initial concessions).
In a post-experimental questionnaire, four items assessed the
effectiveness of the power manipulation (e.g., “I felt powerless in
the course of the negotiation”; “Compared to my opponent I felt
superior”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, α = 0.80).
Additionally, several items asked for demographic data (e.g., sex,
age, field of study).
Results
Manipulation Check
As expected, participants in the high-power condition felt more
powerful than participants in the three low-power conditions,
t(87) = 2.32, p = 0.023. The one-way ANOVA was marginally
significant, F(3,87)= 2.38, p= 0.075, η2p = 0.08. As expected, the
low-power conditions did not differ from each other, ts(87)< 1.4,
ps> 1.90.
Final Offers
As expected, participants in the low-power condition (M = 12.63,
SD = 2.22) made less ambitious final offers than participants
in the high-power condition (M = 14.48, SD = 3.53),
t(36.83)= 2.14, p= 0.039, d= 0.63 (Figure 2). Participants in the
low power+goal condition (M = 14.80, SD = 3.58) counteracted
this low power detriment. They made more ambitious final offers
than participants in the low-power condition (t[40.34] = 2.57,
p = 0.014, d = 0.73) and did not differ from the high-power
condition, t(45.78) = −0.31, p = 0.755, d = −0.09. Participants
in the low power+plan condition (M = 14.43, SD = 2.83)
also outperformed the low-power condition, t(41.78) = 2.43,
p = 0.019, d = 0.71, and did not differ from the high-power
condition, t(41.99) = 0.05, p = 0.963, d = 0.02, and the low
power+goal condition, t(44.90) = −0.39, p = 0.700, d = −0.12.
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FIGURE 2 | Study 2: Final offers as a function of power and
self-regulatory technique (higher values indicate fewer concessions).
Low-power negotiators made lower final offers than high-power negotiators
and low-power negotiators with self-regulatory help. Error bars indicate
±1 SEM.
The overall ANOVA was marginally significant, F(3,91) = 2.45,
p= 0.069, η2p = 0.08.
Process Analyses
To shed light on (1) how power differences affect negotiation
outcomes and (2) how self-regulation helps to overcome the low-
power disadvantage, we examined the competing mediators of
initial concessions and subsequent simultaneously (PROCESS
macro; Hayes, 2013, Model 4; 5,000 bootstrapped samples). To
obtain a pure measure of subsequent concessions and to control
for the overlap with initial concessions, we partialled out initial
concessions from concessions during the subsequent negotiation.
In a first step, we analyzed whether initial or subsequent
concessions mediated the detrimental effect of low power versus
high power on final outcomes. Condition was coded according
to the observed outcome pattern (low-power condition = –1,
high-power condition = +1). There was neither a significant
indirect effect through initial, b = −0.22, SE = 0.27, BC
CI95% [−0.758, +0.299], nor through subsequent concessions,
b = −0.28, SE = 0.23, BC CI95% [−0.788, +0.129]. This
leaves the question how power affects final outcomes currently
unanswered.
In a second step, we analyzed whether the beneficial effect
of self-regulation was mediated through initial concessions
or through subsequent concessions. Again, condition was
coded according to the observed outcome pattern (low-power
condition = –2, low power+goal condition = +1, low
power+plan condition = +1). There was a significant indirect
effect through initial concessions on final outcomes, b = 0.38,
SE = 0.19, BC CI95% [+0.023, +0.771]. The indirect path
through subsequent concessions was not significant (b = 0.11,
SE = 0.12, BC CI95% [−0.123, +0.358]). These mediation
analyses suggest that self-regulatory techniques helped to
overcome the low-power disadvantage by means of smaller initial
concessions (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 | Study 2: Mediation of the self-regulation effect by initial
and subsequent concessions. The indirect path through initial concessions
reaches significance, the path through subsequent concessions does not.
Total effect of self-regulation before inclusion of mediators in parentheses.
Discussion
Replicating Study 1 and prior research (Van Kleef et al., 2006),
low-power negotiators made more conciliatory final offers than
high-power negotiators. Importantly, both setting goals and
forming if-then plans counteracted this disadvantage: Low-
power negotiators with a goal and those who had additionally
formed a plan made more ambitious final offers. Follow-
up process analyses investigated the underlying mechanisms
for this effect. The analyses suggested that self-regulation
helps negotiators to overcome their low-power disadvantage
by showing more resistance at the very beginning of a
negotiation. One would expect that successfully overcoming the
detrimental effect of low power requires low-power negotiators
to tackle the same mediator that caused the detrimental
effect of low power in the first place. Yet, neither initial nor
subsequent concessions mediated the basic effect of power
difference. This may have been due to a lack of statistical
power and calls for a replication with a larger sample
size.
STUDY 3
Study 3 sought to conceptually replicate Study 2 in a larger
sample. Moreover, the paradigm is geared toward measuring
the process of negotiations rather than negotiation outcomes.
Final agreements are not measured. As, however, final agreements
are an important dependent variable, we assessed negotiators’
absolute limits as a proxy of final agreements.
Furthermore, Study 3 aims to address two possible confounds
of Studies 1 and 2. Both in Study 1 and 2, we used
several power manipulations to ensure a particularly strong
manipulation of power. Those manipulations might have
interacted in an unforeseen manner, manipulating more than
power. Accordingly, we used a single power manipulation in
Study 3. Moreover, low-power participants in Study 2 received
more text messages than high-power negotiators, making the
conditions less comparable. In Study 3 there was no difference
in the messages received.
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Method
Participants and Design
Six hundred and thirty-four participants (Modusage = 20–24
years) from across the country completed this online study. As
in Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to a (1) high
power, (2) low power, (3) low power+goal, or (4) low power+plan
condition. As remuneration for taking part in the study, all
participants entered a lottery for a €25 gift certificate of a popular
internet store.
Procedure
Participants were recruited on Facebook. As in Study 2,
participants assumed the role of a job candidate in an online
negotiation with a prospective employer about the conditions
of a possible work contract. After reading the instructions,
participants were asked two attention check questions and their
subjectively felt power was measured for the first time (see below).
Next, the self-regulation manipulation was established in the
goal and the plan conditions (see below). Participants then saw
a “Waiting for partner” message while the program allegedly
connected participants to their opponent. Negotiations lasted for
a total of three rounds of offers and counteroffers. After that,
participants were told that the study’s goal was to examine early
phases of negotiations and that it had not been necessary to
reach a final agreement. Then, participants were asked for their
absolute acceptance limit (i.e., the lowest offer from the employer
they would have been willing to accept). Finally, subjectively felt
power was measured a second time and participants completed
a post-experimental questionnaire before being debriefed and
thanked.
Negotiation Task
The negotiation task was similar to Study 2 with the following
exceptions: participants could not send messages, the negotiation
ended after three rounds (instead of six), participants were not
told that the points they earned would be converted into lottery
tickets, and participants were not told that only dyads with an
agreement would participate in the lottery.
Experimental Manipulations
In contrast to Study 2 and to keep the study brief, we used only
one power manipulation: High-power negotiators were told that
they had numerous job offers, which they could fall back to if this
negotiation ended without an agreement (Pinkley et al., 1994). In
contrast, low-power parties were told that the market was very
competitive and that they had no alternatives to this particular
job opportunity.
Self-regulation was manipulated as in Study 2. We shortened
the if-then plan to: “If my opponent makes a request, then I will
not be swayed and budge from my offer in small steps only.”
Dependent Variables
Participants’ absolute limits served as the main dependent
variable. The nature of the paradigm does not allow measuring
final agreements, since negotiations were interrupted after three
rounds (e.g., De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995; Sinaceur and
Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef and Côté, 2007). Absolute limits were
collected as a proxy of final agreements.
In follow-up analyses, initial concessions (first counteroffers)
and subsequent concessions during the negotiation process
served as competing mediators. Subsequent concessions were
calculated as final counteroffers minus counteroffer in round 2
(with initial concessions partialled out to remove overlap between
the two mediators, see Study 2).
After instructions, we asked two attention check questions to
confirm that each participant had understood the task and her/his
role [e.g., “How are you supposed to imagine your situation?:
(a) My chances on the labor market are good, (b) My chances
on the labor market are comparable to those of my peers,
(c) My chances on the labor market are poor”]. In addition,
subjectively felt power was assessed with one item before and
after the negotiation (“I feel/felt powerful in this role as potential
employee”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Finally,
several items asked for demographic data [e.g., sex, age (assessed
in categories spanning 5 years each)] and participants could
report any difficulties encountered during the study in an open
text box.
Results
Manipulation Check
As expected, after the power manipulation, but before the
negotiation, participants in the high-power condition felt
significantly more powerful than participants in the three low-
power conditions, t(348.56) = 24.46, p < 0.001, d = 2.62. The
one-way ANOVA was highly significant, F(3,623) = 141.78,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.41. Power ratings in the low power+goal and
the low power+plan conditions did not differ from the low-power
condition (ts< 1.20, ps> 0.250).
After the negotiation, a one-way ANOVA again revealed
a significant, but less pronounced difference between the
conditions, F(3,623) = 27.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12. Again,
participants in the high-power condition felt significantly more
powerful than participants in the three low-power conditions
t(220.86) = 8.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.10. This time, however,
participants in the low power+plan condition felt more powerful
than participants in the low-power condition t(322.62) = 2.28,
p = 0.023, d = 0.25, indicating that their perceptions of
power increased during the process of the negotiation (see
Study 1). Participants in the low power+goal condition did not
differ significantly from participants in the low-power control
condition, t(320.18)= 1.26, p= 0.210, d = 0.14.
Final Offers
As expected, participants in the low-power condition (M = 11.56,
SD= 3.45) reported lower absolute limits than participants in the
high-power condition (M = 13.99, SD = 3.83), t(623) = 5.89,
p < 0.001, d = 0.47. Participants in the low power+goal
condition (M = 12.95, SD = 3.66) counteracted this power
detriment. They reported higher final offers than participants in
the low-power condition, t(623) = 3.40, p = 0.001, d = 0.27.
However, those limits were still lower than those of high-power
participants, t(623) = 2.45, p = 0.014, d = 0.20. Participants
in the low power+plan condition (M = 14.23, SD = 3.79) also
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FIGURE 4 | Study 3: Absolute Limits as a function of power and self-regulatory technique (higher values indicate higher limits). Low-power negotiators
had lower absolute limits (implying lower final outcomes) than high-power negotiators and low-power negotiators with self-regulatory help. Error bars indicate
±1 SEM.
FIGURE 5 | Study 3: Mediation of the power effect by initial
concessions and subsequent concessions. The indirect path through
initial concession is significant, the path through subsequent concessions is
not. Total effect of power before inclusion of mediators in parentheses.
reported higher absolute limits than participants in the low-power
condition, t(623) = 6.54, p < 0.001, d = 0.52, and did not
differ from the high-power condition, t(623) = −0.57, p = 0.572,
d = 0.05. Moreover, they outperformed participants in the low
power+goal condition, t(623) = 3.05, p = 0.002, d = 0.24.
The one-way ANOVA was highly significant, F(3,623) = 17.80,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08 (Figure 4). There was the expected
linear trend of more ambitious absolute limits from the low-
power condition, to the goal and plan conditions, with the
latter conceding at a similar level as the high-power condition,
F(1,624)= 52.64, p< 0.001 (Figure 4).
Process Analyses
We conducted the same process analyses as in Experiment 2.
There was a significant indirect effect of power on absolute
limits through initial concessions, b = −0.69, SE = 0.13, BC
FIGURE 6 | Study 3: Mediation of the self-regulation effect by initial
concessions and subsequent concessions. The indirect path through
initial concession is significant; the path through process concessions is not.
Total effect of self-regulation before inclusion of mediators in parentheses.
CI95% [−0.954, −0.464]. The indirect path through subsequent
concessions was not significant (b = 0.02, SE = 0.08, BC CI95%
[−0.142, +0.169]). This finding suggests that power unfolded its
effect mainly at the beginning of the negotiation (Figure 5).
In a second step, we again analyzed if the beneficial effect
of self-regulation was mediated through initial or subsequent
concessions (see Study 2). Replicating results from Study 2,
there was a significant indirect effect through initial concessions,
b = 0.37, SE = 0.07 BC CI95% [+0.232, +0.504], whereas the
indirect path through subsequent concessions was not significant,
b=−0.01, SE= 0.05, BC CI95% [−0.113,+0.085] (Figure 6).
Discussion
Study 3 replicated the main findings from Study 2 with a
larger sample. Again, participants with self-regulatory help of
setting goals or forming if-then plans attenuated the low-power
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disadvantage. This time, low-power negotiators with additional
if-then plans made even less conciliatory offers than those who
were only equipped with goals. Most likely, finding this difference
between the goal and the if-then conditions – an a priori
predicted effect – was due to the much larger sample size of Study
3 (compared to Study 2). Moreover, Study 3 demonstrates that
power unfolds its effect mainly at the beginning of a negotiation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Being in a low-power position represents a serious negotiation
disadvantage. In Study 1, low-power parties without self-
regulatory help were exploited by their more powerful opponents
in a face-to-face negotiation. Study 2 revealed a similar pattern
in a computer-mediated negotiation. Low-power negotiators
without self-regulatory help made more conciliatory final offers
to a simulated opponent than high-power negotiators. Study
3 replicated these findings in a large online sample. Given
that crafting profitable deals is a key goal in negotiations,
poorer negotiation outcomes by low-power parties constitute
impaired goal attainment. The present findings suggest that the
self-regulation techniques of setting goals and forming if-then
plans can help to overcome this low power disadvantage. In
Study 1, low-power negotiators who had set themselves a goal,
achieved similarly high outcomes as their high-power opponents.
In Study 2, both low-power parties equipped with a goal and
those who additionally formed an if-then plan overcame this
disadvantage. Equally, in Study 3 goals and if-then plans helped
low-power participants to resist large and premature concessions
to a high-power opponent. Participants who had formed an
if-then plan performed better than those who had only set a
goal. In sum, leading low-power negotiators to use techniques
that are supposed to strengthen goal pursuit improved their
goal attainment at the negotiation table (i.e., they reached more
profitable negotiation outcomes).
It is important to note that self-regulatory help was pitted
against multiple, established power manipulations. In Study 1,
high-power negotiators were motivated by monetary incentives,
benefited from a superior role, superior alternatives, and a power
priming procedure. Nevertheless, negotiators overcame the low-
power disadvantage if they were provided with self-regulatory
help. Similarly, in Study 2 we used two power manipulations
and again outcomes were linked to real world incentives. Again,
self-regulatory assistance overcame the low-power disadvantage.
Studies 2 and 3 also sought to identify one process underlying
the power disadvantage, as well as the positive effects of
setting goals and forming plans. Study 3 demonstrated that
low power unfolds its detriment mainly because of higher
initial concessions. In contrast to subsequent concessions, these
initial concessions statistically accounted for the low-power
disadvantage (although not in the weaker powered Study 2). In
both studies, initial concessions mediated the success of self-
regulatory aid, whereas subsequent concessions did not. This
suggests that the self-regulation interventions helped particularly
in the early phases of the negotiations. These results are in line
with a host of studies speaking to the importance of negotiations’
early stages (e.g., Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Loschelder
et al., 2014a, 2016).
In sum, the self-regulatory tools applied in the present studies
led low-power negotiators to make self-serving counteroffers,
to reject bad offers by their opponent, and to resist large and
premature concessions. Although it may seem obvious that these
are beneficial negotiation strategies, research suggests that people
with low power generally have trouble initiating even simple goal-
directed actions (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007; Steidle
et al., 2013). Deliberately setting goals and forming if-then plans
to engage in these behaviors are therefore promising and easily
implemented tools for low-power parties.
We are optimistic that the present findings will generalize to
real-life negotiations. At the outset of this article, we introduced
a job applicant facing a low ball offer and raised the question
how she could craft a profitable deal despite being in a low-
power position. Based on our findings, this negotiator should pay
close attention to not making large concessions early on, despite
being in a low-power position and despite being confronted with
an ambitious first offer from her high-power opponent. Setting
goals and additionally forming if-then plans lend themselves to
implement these negotiation strategies. Even though if-then plans
did not always yield an additional benefit over goals for the low-
power negotiators, they are recommendable as they are easy to
implement, quick, and do not require a lot of mental resources.
Consequently, they have been applied successfully in a host of
different real-world contexts (e.g., Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006).
In both Studies 2 and 3 if-then plans included a negation
(e.g., “[. . .] then I will not budge”). Their effectiveness appears
to be at odds with evidence suggesting that negations in if-then
plans can produce ironic effects by increasing the accessibility
of the unwanted response (Adriaanse et al., 2011). There are a
few possibilities why ironic effects did not occur in our studies.
For example, ironic effects might be linked to specific behaviors.
Adriaanse et al. (2011) investigated eating behavior. What we
eat is largely a habit and habits are strong, automatic behavioral
tendencies (Verplanken and Wood, 2006). Possibly, habits have
a particularly pronounced potential to override desired actions.
Another explanation lies in the nature of computer-mediated
negotiations. It has been shown that negations first activate
what they are supposed to prevent before they activate the
desired opposite (Hasson and Glucksberg, 2006). This indicates
that ironic effects might be particularly pronounced when fast
responses are required. This is not the case in computer-mediated
negotiations. After receiving an offer, participants had time to
overthink their actions, potentially preventing ironic effects.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present studies established that the self-regulatory techniques
of setting goals and if-then plans are capable of improving
negotiation outcomes of low-power parties. One limitation of
the present studies is that they did not fully elucidate the
psychological mechanisms underlying these beneficial effects
of the self-regulation techniques. We based our case on
the observation that low-power negotiators attain suboptimal
outcomes and on prior findings demonstrating that people with
low (as compared to high) power have difficulties to set goals
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and pursue them effectively (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005; Steidle
et al., 2013). Accordingly, we used goal setting and if-then plans
to help low-power negotiators implement broad negotiation
strategies like rejecting bad offers. Admittedly, this is a rather
unspecific approach: First, we do not know how exactly low
power (compared to high power) influenced goal setting and goal
pursuit in the present studies. Second, it remains unclear how
exactly participants understood and processed the self-regulatory
aid. This, equally, needs to be addressed—especially since, in
contrast to earlier studies (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006), only
one of three studies (Study 3) demonstrated an incremental
benefit of if-then plans compared to setting goals.
The process analyses reported in Studies 2 and 3 may provide
some insight into why this was the case. These analyses revealed
that – beyond initial concessions – subsequent concessions did
not account for the self-regulatory effects on final outcomes.
This indicates that participants either stopped following the
plan or applied it more rigorously in the initial stages.
Accordingly, future research could investigate two different
approaches to maximize the if-then plan effect. First, if-then plans
should be geared toward unfolding their effect throughout the
negotiation (e.g., “Throughout the negotiation, if my opponent
makes a request, then I will not be swayed and budge from
my offer in small steps only”). Second, if-then plans could
specifically address resistance to initial concessions (e.g., “At
the beginning of the negotiation, if my opponent makes any
request, then I will make sure not to be swayed and take
a tough stance”). In both cases, detailed additional measures
need to tap into negotiators understanding of the goals and
plans.
On a related note, it might be argued that the goals assigned to
participants were not challenging and specific enough, potentially
curbing the benefits of these goals (Zetik and Stuhlmacher,
2002). However, assigning specific goals does not come without
risks. In negotiations – where the motives and tactics of one’s
counterpart are unclear – actors with general “do your best” goals
do better than those with specific goals (Polzer and Neale, 1995).
Nevertheless, investigating the relative advantages and downsides
of more specific goals is a promising avenue for future research.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Power is one of the most fundamental determinants for
negotiation behavior and outcomes (Thompson et al., 2010).
Frequently, low power is associated with excessive concessions
and impaired negotiation outcomes. The question of how to
overcome the low-power disadvantage has received surprisingly
little attention, however. In the present research, we applied
a self-regulatory perspective that understands the low-power
disadvantage as impaired goal attainment. The self-regulation
techniques of setting goals and forming plans helped low-power
parties to attain markedly improved negotiation outcomes –
particularly so by reducing their higher initial concessions.
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